Law Text Culture
Volume 4 Issue 2

Article 12

1998

The place of theory in Australian constitutional law: a review of T
Blackshield and G Williams, Australian constitutional lawand theory, 2nd
edition, Federation Press, 1998
C. Arnott

Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/ltc

Recommended Citation
Arnott, C., The place of theory in Australian constitutional law: a review of T Blackshield and G
Williams, Australian constitutional lawand theory, 2nd edition, Federation Press, 1998, Law Text
Culture, 4, 1998, 197-226.
Available at:https://ro.uow.edu.au/ltc/vol4/iss2/12
Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information
contact the UOW Library: research-pubs@uow.edu.au

The place of theory in Australian constitutional law: a review of T Blackshield and
G Williams, Australian constitutional lawand theory, 2nd edition, Federation Press,
1998
Abstract
The success of Blackshield and Williams' Australian Constitutional Law and Theory Commentary and
Materials is well indicated by the speedy appearance of its second, edition. It has rapidly and deservedly
become the leading available casebook for teachers and students of law interested in the theoretical
dimension to the subject. Australian constitutional jurisprudence, for those of us schooled in it, has been
notorious for ignoring the political and sodal nature ofconstitutional law. By this I do not just mean the
political context of legislative or government actions and constitutional challenge, but I mean the political
and philosophical principles inherent in explaining, interpreting and developing the meaning of Australia's
constitution. For those interested in teaching and crafting a principled constitutionalism in this latter
sense, the introduction of a theoretical dimension by Blackshield and Williams has been promising.

This journal article is available in Law Text Culture: https://ro.uow.edu.au/ltc/vol4/iss2/12

The Place of Theory in Australian
Constitutional Law
A Review of T Blackshield and G Williams,

Australian Constitutional Law and Theory,
2nd Edition, Federation Press, 1998

Craig Arnott
The success ofBlackshield and Williams' Australian Constitutional
Law and Theory Commentary and Materials is well indicated by
the speedy appearance of its second, edition. It has rapidly and
deservedly become the leading available casebook for teachers
and students of law interested in the theoretical dimension to
the subject. Australian constitutional jurisprudence, for those of
us schooled in it, has been notorious for ignoring the political
and sodal nature ofconstitutional law. By this I do not just mean
the political context of legislative or government actions and
constitutional challenge, but I mean the political and
philosophical principles inherent in explaining, interpreting and
developing the meaning of Australia's constitution. For those
interested in teaching and crafting a principled constitutionalism
in this latter sense, the introduction of a theoretical dimension
by Blackshield and Williams has been promising.

Absences Between The Extracts
For all that, however, one feels a sense of disappointment with
the second edition. Its worth remains primarily as a casebook
rather than as a commentar}'. Make no mistake, it is superior to
the first edition) mainly in its streamlined and more coherent
structure. The disappointment is ,that of a promise not quite
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fulfilled.· The novelty and worth of the hook is its. treatment of
theory and yet the second edition, with some improvements on
the first, reveals that treatment is all too sparse. A reviewer should,
of course, be careful not to reprimand the authors of a book for
not having written or compiled the book the reviewer would
have produced. However, Blackshield and Williams have claimed
the mantle of constitutional theory and it is fair to ask how the
book measures against the standard they claim; does it provide
the ideological and doctrinal contexts that would explain the
shifting and evolving expositions oflaw given by the High Court
(Blackshield & Williams 1998: vi)? It cannot be said adequately
to do that in three important respects which remain crucial
absences between the extracts.
First, the relevance of and reliance on postmodernist and
deconstructionist theories, intermittently injected, is not made
clear., This is a critical methodological problem because the
authors seem to challenge the orthodox view of positivism that
'law is what the cases say' simpliciter by suggesting one must
understand the doctrinal context of the law (Blackshield &
Williams 1998: vi, 245, 251ff). Yet they ultimately to fail to
provide a doctrinal context themselves for their own work or for
judging the High Court's. Second, and related to the first, the
extent to which theoretical dimensions are introduced at all is
sporadic and inconsistent across the subject matter ofthe_chapters.
Third, the most fundamental problem of constitutional theory
- the constitutional claim of authority or legitimacy - remai~~
dramatically underexplored. I will suggest that there is a body of
work of 'reconstructive critical theory' which has made an
important contribution to this topic that has been entirely
overlooked by Blackshield and Williams. The aim of that critical
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theory is both to provide an alternative to legal positivism and
explain the meaning and role of popular sovereignty in a
constitutional state. Both aims have direct hearing on Australian
constitutional discourse today and, ironically, weaknesses in
Blackshield and Williams' casebook.
Below I detail what I see as the weakness in these three
areas. Let me first reiterate that this is a superior edition to the
first, with new material and chapters added and a cleaner
structure. Chapter Six on interpretation has become a highlight
and I only wish that the hints ofinterpretative rigour and insight
it contains were applied consistently throughout the other
substantive chapters. The innovative chapter on Indigenous
Peoples and the Question of Sovereignty (now Chapter Four) is
clearer than in the first edition, but resiles from dealing with the
pressing question of what Aboriginal self-determination might
mean. This is indicative of the problem with the treatment of
theory in the book: how will we derive and make sense of the
principles of Australian constitutionalism? Our struggle to do
this will help suggest answers to problems such as 'selfdetermination'. The authors, for the most part, sidestep that
challenge.
The chapters on 'implied freedoms' (expanded into The
Implied Freedom of Political Communication, a separate and
deserved treatment of Political Communication and the Law of
Defamation and the Implied Right to Due Process) are, I believe,
great improvements in this edition. These themes have been given
the prominence they deserve, that many constiturionallawyers
have been loath to accord them, and yet the chapters still remain
theoretically weak. There is almost no theoretical treatment

199

Arnott

included, from Australian academic commentators or others, of
what free expression or rights in a constitutional sense might
mean. Indeed the selection of US First Amendment cases does
not convey the ideological context of First Amendment
jurisprudence at al1. At least the different ways that the American
jurisprudence has influenced the High Court judgments in this
field - a cause for note itself - could usefully be clarified. The
attention to Levy v Victoria 1 at the conclusion ofChapter 25 may
also be somewhat misplaced. The issue of the subject matter of
the freedom is turning out to be far less controversial than the
test for assessing potential legislative infringement and how
influential US ideas ofvalue...n.eutralityturn out to be. 2 There are
profound ideological disputes at the heart of the interpretation
of rights in relation to freedom of communication, and yet the
authors do little to reveal them. Of all areas ripe for more robust
intellectual analysis, especially in the light of the brakes applied
by Lange vABC,3 this is surely it. Most importantly, the influence
of ideas ofpopular sovereignty on the justification and meaning
of implied rights needs to be explored in relation to those
judgments that have sought to corral the scope of constitutional
rights by an appeal to the Constitution's (text and structure'.
The first chapter does introduce some ofthe philosophical
issues at the heart of constitutional law and it is an improvement
on the first edition to introduce these themes at the outset.
However, it remains a cut-and-paste approach to theoretical
context. The authors are right to imply that the shallow brand of
legal positivism-that has sustained Australian constitutional law
has largely ignored the theoretical context that explains prevailing
and possible approaches to constitutional interpretation. More
particularly in Chapter Six they express doubts about an apolitical
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literalism and a confined legalistic approach to constitutional
interpretation (Blackshield & Williams 1998: 245, 251 ff).
Courts, they insist from the outset, do not simply expound
objective doctrine that students should uncritically learn
(Blackshield & Williams 1998: vi). It is for this reason that one
detects the promise of a non-positivist or 'non-interpretativist'
approach with the casebook. (Ely 1980: 1 aligns positivism and
interpretivism as both indicating that constitutional issues can
be resolved by enforcing dear norms in the 'text' of the
Constitution and without reference to other principles.) One
also senses a sympathy with Foucauldian postmodernism and
the casebook in this edition now begins with a quote from The
Archaeology ofKnowledge (1972) where Foucault opines that
'commentary's only role is to say finally, what has silently been
articulated deep down' (quoted at Blackshield & Williams 1998:
v). In the light of this hermeneutical perspective one can
understand the authors' claim that there is no determinate body
of doctrine in law. However if one accepts that as their starting
point, that does not explain the authors' inconsistent approach
to articulating the philosophies that have been used by jurists
deep down to justify prevailing legal doctrine. The suggestive
comments by Blackshield and Williams to challenge an apolitical
legalism in constitutional law remain that; hints rather than a
fuHy expounded approach to organising the cases and
commentary. One can fairly say that the casebook is not a
philosophical tract. Yet even so, should not one at least know
what principles mould the authors' choice of material they
include? Does not this choice too reflect premises deep down?
There is a rigour demanded ofarticulating and exposing prevailing
philosophies, and while some ofthese philosophies are identified
in Chapter One, the rigorous exercise of articulating their
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influence in judicial approaches is not carried through into all
the chapters that follow.

1. A Postmodernist Approach To Theory?
I should reveal that I remain uncertain about the efficacy of a
Foucauldian analysis of constitutional interpretation. I say this
as a critical scholar. There are grave difficulties, I believe, in tying
Foucault's philosophy to a theoretical undertaking which seeks
to chalJenge dominant modes of legal thinking. It has been said
ofdeconstructionist method - often invoked on behalfofgroups
who are disadvantaged by dominant modes of thinking - that:
it is hard to see how it can come to the aid of anyone. The
argument is self-undermining ... deconstructionism has nothing
more to say for the view that intellectual standards are masks
for the will to power than that it too reflects the will topowerfor
deconstructionists. But why then bother with intellectual life at
all, which is not the fastest, surest, or even most satisfYing path
to political power, if it is political power that one is really after
(Gutmann 1994: 18-9, my emphasis)?

Here, then, is the trouble with seeing Foucault's hermeneutical
analysis as a renunciation of normative judgments. It is a
renunciation Blackshield and Williams appear to share when they
say forthrightly that they have contestable assumptions, just as
everyone does, hut these cannot shed light on ambiguities or
claim to authoritatively organise the materials; they are just
contestable assumptions that one either holds or does not
(Blackshield & Williams 1998: vii) .Yet, if there are no normative
standards of evaluation to be preferred we will no longer be able
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to advance justified reasons for opposing specific techniques of
power, including when those techniques are tools ofconstitutional
interpretation. The danger of Foucault's analysis is a complete
surrender ofthe theoretical reference to norms, and, at their most
extreme, this has led some postmodernists to eschew theory
altogether (Honneth 1993: xxiv). This 'deconstructionist trap'
may ultimately deprive critical scholars ofsustainable intellectual
tools to oppose positivist or interpretivist thinking. Ironically; as
I shall go on to argue, this very danger seems highlighted in the
approach to case law in the casebook.

2. A Sporadic Approach To Theory
There are many interesting themes introduced in the first chapter's
eclectic mix but their presentation is descriptive. It will be eyeopening to many readers to have had them presented at all and
some of them are novel for their appearance in a constitutional
law casebook - for instance, The State, The Liberal Tradition,
The Critique of Individualism, Citizenship - but their mere
inclusion take us no closer to explaining the very first conundrum
raised: what is 'constitutionalism' (Blackshield & Williams 1998:
2)? True it is that the authors politely say they do not wish to
foist their ideological view on us (Blackshield & Williams 1998:
vii), but is it not Foucault's point that in order to avoid the silent
hold of ideologies we must expose the linking themes of
ideological discourses, 'their dusters ofrelations' (Foucault 1978:
23 at Blackshield & Williams 1998: 13)?
Even the first article extracted, Sartori's 1962 article on
Constitutionalism, is uncritically accepted by the authors' as
elaborating the meaning, let alone relevance, of a constitution
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being characterised as garantiste, nominal or fat;ade. If this is tQ
be the starting point for doubting the positivist conception of
constitutions - even if one thinks it an anomalous starting point
for a postmodernisr - then surely we are entitled to have
articulated Sartori's teleological approach to constitutionalism
and how this contrasts with the dominant liberal deontological
approach to limit state power through constitutional rights that
has so influenced 'liberal' judges on the High Court this decade.
Chapter Two is very strong in the intelligent array ofarticles
chosen to shed light on Diceyan theory and Westminster notions
of parliamentary sovereignty. But it concludes by throwing no
light at all on where these notions stand in Australian
constitutional interpretation today. As the authors note at the
outset) our Constitution is notorious for its uneasy mix of
Westminster-styled responsible government and Americaninfluenced federalism and ideas of limited government. What is
the contemporary interplay of these philosophies? In particular,
since American constitutional jurisprudence has exerted a greater
influence on the Court's development of ideas about delimiting
parliament's power, a clear schism has developed in the approach
taken by High Court judges towards ascertaining the scope of
what the parliament may do. One might have thought this a
central theme for the authors to explore, but they do not. It comes
centrally in to play in the recent controversy about the role of
'proportionality' in characterising Commonwealth laws as within
power or not. Blackshield and Williams provide us with the
pertinent case extracts in Chapter 13 but no thematic context
that would helpe.xplain the position Mason C] took in
Nationwide News v Wills, 4 Dawson Js conservative intransigence
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or Kirby J's continued flirtation with this idea as a new tool of
characterisation in Leask v Commonwealth. 5
In order to understand the opposing doctrinal positions
on the High Court in regard to parliamentary power one migh t,
for instance, compare the radically divergent conception in Deane
1's judgment in Polyukhovich v The Commonwealth with the
judgments of Dawson or McHugh JJ.6 Indeed Toohey J in that
case draws on compelling rule of law themes to constrain
parliament very similar to those ofT R S Allen and Eric Barendt
which are extracted. 7 Those themes in turn may have significant
bearing on the im plici t nature of rights to be drawn from the
Constitution's structure not to mention the role electors play in
a parliamentary system. Such ideas are expressly involved in how
one conceives the scope of judicial review and the separation of
judicial from legislative power. The relevant Polyukhovich
judgments are extracted in Chapter 27 on The Implied Right of
Due Process, one of the most sophisticated chapters, but the
au thors draw no thematic links with the early works of theory
they include. Chapter Six (Approaches to Constitutional
Interpretation) does canvass the i$sues of judicial activism and
restraint yet the new Chapter 12 (The Separation of Judicial
Power) is one of the more pedestrian. The one theoretical piece,
Tony Blackshield's own, and I must say very useful, extract on
the definition of judicial power (Blackshield 1981: 183-88 at
Blackshield & Williams: 532-5) that is carried over from the
first edition is still offered hesitantly; the authors seem unsure
what to do with it other than saying 'and here's a piece oftheory'.
One reads this chapter not so much with the sense of
philosophical assumptions being exposed as one senses the
presentation of the case law, much as a judge would ask from
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counsel or much as one of myoid constitutional law lecturers
would have expected me to have simply learned.
Chapter Nine is clear in the legal issues ofstate legislative
procedure and manner and form requirements, but, again, the
opportunity to expound on the larger themes about how
parliamentary power might be justified or constrained has gone
wanting. The authors have maintained a very traditional approach
to presenting the notoriously opaque judgments in this area and
give none ofthe political context in which they occur. The use to
which conservative legal philosophies might put manner and form
requirements is dearly expounded, for instance, in articles by J
Goldsworthy and H P Lee (Goldsworthy 1987, Lee 1992). Their
approach stands at odds with that of Blackshield and William's
chapter and yet we are not exposed to the contestable assumptions
or provided with the philosophies that might explain and justify
when and why judges have decided that the will of parliament
cannot be fettered, when it can be, and the dividing lines for
disagreement. .
The omission of such assumptions about the role of
parliamentary power at the Federal level is even more apparent
in the section on interpretation of s 57. The authors do provide
us with the clash of approaches of Barwick CJ and Gibbs Jagainst
Jacobs and Murphy JJ but with no elucidation of the way the
dashing philosophies of responsible government and federalism,
introduced in Chapter Five) might be assessed. They tantalise us
by questioning. Fraser and Kerls reliance on s 57 in the 1975
crisis but suggest no interpretative tools to help answer it. Indeed
the section in Chapter Ten on the 1975 crisis is strangely limp~
Again it is an instance of the absence of theory. The crisis itself is
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not a discrete event or curiosity but is an organising theme about
the deficiencies ofdemocratic safeguards in the Constitution and
the collision of Westminster conventions of responsible
government with federalism. While it is so often thought, no
doubt correctly, that it was an impetus towards our becoming a
Republic, the main ramifications for parliamentary democracy
have been glossed over in the republican debate and they are
here too. The uncertain role of the House of Representatives visa-vis the Senate and the Executive, so radically undermined in
the crisis, remains with us as an issue bearing on a claim Australia
makes to constitutional democracy.
Certainly some of these themes are aired in Chapter Eight
on The Parliament and the authors in that chapter have skilfully
juxtaposed extracts from judgments to convey the cut and thrust
of judicial debate about the power of the Commonwealth and
the role of the electors in the constitutional scheme, but again
they give little political context or ideological dimension. The
authors seem to justify this by reciting the 'indeterminacy' of
constitutional law which leaves a fundamental conflict between
the values of democracy and federalism, revealed in a case such
as the First Territory Senators Case, 8 as simply a matter ofjudicial
choice (Blackshield & Williams 1998: 350). In the preface the
authors state: 'the ambiguities and indeterminacies of the
authoritative legal materials ... compel the judge ... to draw upon
deeper and ultimately more personal conceptions) of the
constitution and judical process and, then later, they contend
that judges 'marshal any arguments' to support conclusions
already arrived at (Blackshie1d and Williams 1998: vii, 256). But
are the choices here really just matters ofpersonal preference like
choosing one)s favourite flavour of ice cream? 'Hmmm ... this
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week I'll have my democracy with one vote-one value'. As Stephen
J pointed out in the Second Territory Senators Case> reasonable
minds can disagree over the principles to apply to constitutional
imperatives. Are we not entitled, then, to learn of the competing
philosophical principles and theoretical positions which have
influenced judges and commentators and even why some should
be preferred?

Through the inconsistent application of a theoretical
approach one actually sees a consistent problem in the book.
Without articulating their own normative premises and argument
the authors have in fact cleared the stage for, and peppered their
pages with) the positivist approach they questioned at the outset.
One might note the double sense of irony that this - unless I
have underestimated the subversive force of the High Court
extracts as genealogy- is the result ofthe 'deconstructionist trap'
mentioned above. More importantly) the casebook does not
expose readers to critical theory that disputes the deconstructionist
approach and suggests that through critique new normative
standards can be developed. The fact that legal meanings do not
have the rigid certainty that positivists have suggested does not
mean that all normative judgments are lost (Alexy 1989: 293).
Below I shall mention a reconstructive theory that has attempted
to provide a critical standpoint from which one might judge
constitutionalism.

The Critical Use Of Theory
Constitutionalism has at its heart questions about the legitimate
use of power. How to justify the use of power, denoting its
legitimacy, requires a theoretical stance to be taken; a normative
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argument that defends actions and institutions as just (in the
sense ofa claim that they are able to be justified; Benhabib 1989:
143). The very idea ofhaving a constitutional·state, and so having
a law that institutionalises and regulates it, is precisely the modern
idea that power needs to be justified. (Heller 1990: 1380). There
is, of course, significant dispute even within the tradition I take
to be modernist or Enlightenment in origin about how and when
to identify the use of power. One should also point out that the
insistence on giving justificatory reasons is precisely the
Enlightenment legacy which Foucault wishes to contest (Foucault
1984: 32-50). Yet whether one seeks to tnere1y offer an explication
or seek a justification of constitutional power, I think it is fair to
assume that acts of governments, legislatures and courts involve
its use. The authors' too easy use of the 'indeterminacy' thesis
obscures this. The other aspect about the use ofpower the authors
insufficently acknowledge is the way that interpretation itself
operates as ideological power, and all the more so when it goes
unacknowledged. One of the great values of the extracts in the
casebook, especially in the new Chapter Six, is where the idea is
introduced that meanings are precarious, always requiring
justification and scrutiny and reappraisaL There is not language
or text that is neutral or innocent or obvious, that does not carry
presuppositions inseparable from philosophical positions
(McCarthy 1994: 33-4). Part of the task~ then} I suggest of an
examination of constitutional law must involve identifYing its
normative claims and assumptions, as well as that of the
. ,
examIners.

If this were more widely appreciated judges might not be
so ready to imply, as, for instance, McHugh J does in McGinty v
Commonwealth, that by resiling from the question about the role
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of democracy in the Constitution they will avoid contentious,
political matters. 10 Of course, McHugh J's assumption, which
he does not express, is the classically positivist one that there is
some certain meaning that can be given to the 'text and structure'.
of the Constitution that will avoid controversial political
interpretations in which courts should not engage. Yet the
meaning of the Constitution's 'text and structure' is not fixed as
has been perfectly apparent throughout the course ofHigh Court
judgments this century. If politics simply denotes the realm in
which power is contested then one can see such a manoeuvre as
McHugh]'s in McGinty as simply an attempt to obscure a political
act and attempt to withdraw it from scrutiny. For writers on
constitutional law the implications are that our subject involves
the structuring of political power and our approach draws no
less on powerful discourses we use as interpretative devices.

I believe the main theoretical failing of the book is the
failure to identify the arguments and visions about constitutional
law presented as part of ideological discourses of power. I take
ideological discourses to be the exchange of ideas and use of
language that prejudicially structures the way we are able to see
and understand the world and our place in it (Habermas 1988:
169..70). Foucault's own insight here, extracted by the authors
in Chapter One, is very apt: 'there are manifold relations ofpower
which permeate, characterise and constitute the sodal bod)!, and
these relations of power cannot themselves be established,
consolidated nor implemented without the production,
ac~umulation, circulation and functioning of a discourse
...'(Foucault 1980: 93 at Blackshield & Williams 1998: 17-8).A
critical legal theory, as I understand the concept, at least recognises
law as such a discourse, in contrast to positivist theory which
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sees legal discourses as politically 'inert', having no positive
relation to the ideological structuring of our mind's horizon. In
this respect) note again the project Foucault announces and which
is reprinted by the authors:
I am anxious to show you just one thing: how what I am
attempting to bring out through my analysis - the positivity of
discourses ... the systems which regulate their emergence, their
functioning and their transformations - can concern political
practice ... can be objects of a political practice) and in what
system of dependency they can be in relation to it (Fouc~ult
1978: 23 at Blackshie1d & Williams: 14).

My criticism of the chapters above is that the streams of
interpretation and judgments extracted have not heen shown
adequately to be part ofpolitical discourses nor where they stand
in relation to political practices. Indeed in the section in Chapter
Six on postmodern constitutionalism the cadences of Foucaules
project have become slight indeed and now pushed to the fore is
simply the idea that postmodernism means confronting
objectivity by supplying the law's context (for instance the use of
Balkin 1992 at Blackshield & Williams 1998: 293-94). The doubt
I have expressed above about Foucault's project against positivism
is that it is not surprising that it coJIapses into this. 11 The more
specific concern I have as a critical theorist is that Foucault's
analysis may be able to aspire to no more than contextualisation
in law because ofhis apparent view that there is a sense in which
law's power can only be explained not justified; he suggests that
law can only operate oppressively. 'The system of right) the
domain of the law "' should be viewed, I believe, not in terms of
a legitimacy to be established, but in terms of the methods of
subjugation that it instigates) (Foucault 1980: 96 at Blackshield
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& Williams 1998: 18). This seems to suggest a turn away from
law if one is interested in challenging dominant discourses of
power: '[WJe should direct our researches on the nature ofpower
not towards the juridical edifice of sovereignty, the State
apparatuses and the ideologies which accompany them, but
towards domination and the material operators of power
...'(Foucault 1980: 102 at Blackshie1d & Williams 1998: 20).

3. Understanding The Constitution's Claim To
Authority

If one is unwilling to abandon the idea that legal and
constitutional power can be justified there is a necessary starting
point for constitutional theory that many positivists and
postmodernists have neatly elided. It is this: the Constitution
structures and regulates the use of power in the Australian polity;
what is its authority for doing so? One can identify in descriptive
terms that the Constitution claims to be authoritative - the
foundational legal document - and one can identify that it is
part ofthe State's authoritative apparatus. However I use authority
here in its normative sense of a claim to be the legitimate legal
foundation and the legitimate regulation of government which
courts can legitimately interpret. Critical theory, in the
reconstructive sense I indicate below, takes this aim of seeking a
justification for authorio/ to heart. It is drawn from so-called
Frankfurt School critical theory and its idealistic critique of
positivism (Horkheimer 1995 and Wellmer 1971: 128-39). It
insists that accounting for legitimacy is the blind spot ofpositivism
and the neglect of postmodernism. Law is more than a fact, an
actually operating coercive and binding system, it involves an
inherent claim to be legitimate coercion - rules that should be
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followed - and this claim can be normatively assessed. The
challenge, then, is to provide the standards (norms) by which it
may be assessed.

In Australian constitutional law theory there is a radical
schism developing between conservative and radical normative
responses to the 'legitimation crisis' ofthe Australian constitution.
The crisis involves the transfer of sovereignty from the UK
Parliament to the Australian people. For conservatives the issue
is whether there has been such a transfer and, if there has, how to
contain its consequences. For radicals the issue is how the concept
of 'popular sovereignty' can reinterpret Australia's constitution
as a democratic document. (Contrast the approach by Lindell
1986: 44 with Deane J in University ofWoliongong v Metwally. 12)
For all the centrality of this issue since the passage ofthe Australia
Acts in 1986, the Mabo decision, the implied rights cases and the
movement towards a republic the discussion of popular
sovereignty and what that might mean in a constitutional sense
is the most underdeveloped theme in the casebook. There is no
normatively neutral position to take in relation to the emerging
schism. The authors adopt a position even as their methodology
obscures the centrality ofthe'debate to explaining the recent High
Court jurisprudence; an outcome, one suspects, that belies their
sympathies.
In this respect there is another noticeable weakness. The
leading philosopher who has developed a critical theory ofpopular
sovereignty with direct application to constitutional law, JUrgen
Habermas, is omitted by the authors entirely from their collection.
(There was an extract from his Legitimation Crisis (1976) in the
first edition but that has now been lost.) In particular, the latest
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work by Habermas to be translated into English, Between Facts
and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and
Democracy (1996), is of seminal importance to constitutional
theory and while his writing is notoriously dense no serious
commentary in the area can afford to ignore it. Habermas has
been described, from a radical perspective, as the most formidable
critic of Foucault (Bernstein 1992: 281), and in contrast to
Foucault he regards law as one of the central mechanisms to
oppose discourses ofdomination. He says that his hunch - which
he seeks to justify in Between Facts andNorms- is that the rule of
law in a constitutional state (Rechtsstaat) cannot be had or
maintained without radical democracy (Habermas 1996: xlii).
I should say that there is one passing reference to Habermas
in the text in relation to freedom of expression (Blackshield &
Williams 1998: 1084), although none in the index, but, with
respect, the authors have misinterpreted (and typographically
miscited) his work even in this instance. Although this is aside
from my main comments below, the misinterpretation is an
egregious one and needs to be corrected. In Habermas' work the
term 'language' or 'speech' or 'communication' must be
understood in its broadest sense as the use ofmeaningful symbols,
the way that understandings are created in a 'communication
community' (Habermas 1996: 14-6, Habermas 1992: 90). This
draws on the notion ofthe 'illocutionary force' oflanguage (what
is done in saying something), ie. the reference to the conventions
of meaning that operate on an interlocutor at a deeper 'uptake'
level than just the 'propositional content' (what is said) or
'perlocutionary cffe.cts'. (what is done by saying something) ofan
utterance. (Austin 1975: 117) Searle 1969: 42-50, Habermas
1987: 77). This indicates that a right offree speech is not restricted
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to protecting ·'propositionally structured' expression, as the
alithors imply, but broadened to protecting communicative
competence, viz the ability to contribute equally to generating
norins of understanding in a communication community
(Habermas 1992: 108-09 and Habermas 1970).

A Challenge To The Positivist Conception Of Law
Habermas' reference to democracy as the standard by which to
judge the legitimacy of the constitutional state is the challenge
laid down to those positivist conceptions of law that have
specifically sought to deny law's connection to morality and
politics. The discussion of legal positivism by the authors is all
too glib and their description of its use ofthe concept of,power'
highly atrl:biguous (Blackshield & Williams 1998: 8, 256-57).In
their section in Chapte~ One on Legal Foundations and Discourse
digestible references to H LA Hart (or theANU's Tom Campbell)
may be more enlightening than just the large slabs ofHans KeIsen
we are given. Legal positivists have viewed the law as a system of
rules whose validitjiis a question not of moral evaluation but of
adherence to settled 'rules of recognition' (Hart 1994: 100-10).
Law is thus conceivedas neutral and non-ideological, 'a matter
ofsocial fact' (Raz 1979: 38). One might recognise that there are
reasons for obedience from the 'internal perspective' Hart
described, but not go behind those reasons to assess them.
Habermas insists that the empirical account of positivists is
tautological: it only accounts for de facto validity.
Why not be content with the empirical account of
positivism? The authors provide no reason to accept an alternative
theoretical account, although they themselves seem implicitly to
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adopt - without applying - a deconstructionist hermeneutics or
at least a radical indeterminacy thesis. Why bother ifthere are no
justified positions to adopt? Habermas suggests i11- understanding,
the deficiencies of positivism and the ideological nature of legal
discourses we can reconceive the democratic potential of law. In
this way it will be returned to its social tole. Coercible laws must
prove their legitimacy as laws of freedom in the process - and by
the kind of process - of lawmaking. Habermas insists that legal
norms and acts suppose a rationally motivated process ofreaching
understanding within an association of legal consociates. This is
said to be the illocutionary nature of the validity daim that laws
make. Clearly I cannot fully expound on these concepts here.
Suffice it to say that in coming to this understanding Habermas
draws on ordinary language philosophy and 'speech act' theory
and its insights into how meaning is established (Habermas
1994a), including the meaning of what it is to be bound by a
norm. For Habermas this assessment of the reasons for law's
bindingness is not optional; inher~nt within laws is the 'promise
of r~tional acceptability which positivism does not capture
(Habermas 1996: 32-33). Enacted law cannot secure the bases
of its legitimacy simply through a legality which leaves attitudes
and motives up to the addressees, as is the claim ofpositivists. In
other words, one would not know that it was not just habit or
custom or force or apathy which governed compliance and so
the so-called 'background consensus' must be scrutinised to see
of what it consists. Failing this the ideological force of law will
not be examined at all.
That is, one would not examine law as power. What is its
necessary power? The power to bind us to its norms. Positivism
discounts law as an ideological force but Habetmas examines the
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nature of law to show that it necessarily has an ideological
dimension to explain its claim of bindingness and its socially
bonding effect: 'without religious or metaphysical support, the
coercive law tailored for the self-interested use ofindividual rights
can preserve its socially integrating force only insofar as the
addressees of legal norms may at the same time understand
themselves, taken as a whole, as the rational authors of those
norms' (Habermas 1996: 33)..
Because the law at once binds as a fact (one expects average
compliance) and holds itself out as a norm (as legitimate),
Habermas' point is that law is therefore the medium that mediates
between facticity (a forcibly stabilised order) and validity (a
rationally legitimated order) and so provides the crucial
connection Kant saw between coercion and freedom in society.
By holding itselfout as validly binding on all, the inherent claim
oflaw is that this bindingness (its authority) is justified when its
genesis is in, and it in turn protects, conditions 'under which the
will of one person can be unified with the will of another in
accordance with a universal law of freedom' (Kant 1965 at
Habermas 1996: 29 fn 21). What does this mean? Law must be
able to instantiate the conditions under which we can all be selfgoverning and yet govern ourselves collectively. One can only
unify the free will of each with that of others on the basis of
normatively valid rules that deserve the addressee's uncoercedwhich is to say, rationally motivated - recognition and acceptance.
Thus it must always be open to subjects to comply with law on
account of law's normative validity, ie. through 'respect for the
law' (Habermas 1996: 29). This is called a performative or
communicative attitude - one seeks to reach understanding with
others about the cQmmon conditions for each successfully to act
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and live - as opposed to an objectivating or strategic attitude where
one merely calculates the consequences for obedience. Rational
or performative acceptance is possible through 'discursive
redeemability' of law's normative validity claims, ie. a legislative
process open to the contestation of all norms by all people.
Only those norms are valid to which aU affected persons could
agree as participants in rational discourses (Habermas 1996:

107).

For positivists the authority of law resides in its 'peremptory'
nature; law, it is said, does not initiate, it 'precludes conversation
and deliberation' (Hart 1982: 243, Macedo 1990: 82). Habermas
inverts that conclusion with his discourse theory of law. As I
have indicated, he does that by asking what it is about the reasons
for obedience that supplies the law's binding quality. Positivism,
by detaching the legal system from these reasons and so aU internal
connection to morality and politics,
prejudices the analysis in such a way that "law)) is reduced to the
special function of the administration oflaw. One thereby loses
sight of the internalfUnction betWt!en law and the constitutional

organisation ofthe origin, acquisition, and use ofpoliticalpower
(Habermas 1996: 50).

By ignoring this.central aspect ofwhat law does law is reduced to
a system of coordination, supported by legal arguments and
analysis 'exhausted by their function ofreducing the surprise value
of court decisions ... and increasing their actual acceptance of
such decisions bydients' (Habermas 1996: 50). This functionalist
point of view focuses merely on the perlocutionary effects that
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can be achieved by reason...giving: 'they are the means by which
the legal system convinces itself of its own decisions'. In such a
dosed, self-referential or 'autopoietic' system law's high-priced
culture of argumentation is, to the uninitiates, at best a mystery
and at worst a fiction, 'narcissistically marginaHsed' (Habermas
1996: 51). This is the problem with presenting law as simply
'what the cases say'. One overlookS the ideological force ofJaw and the democratic impetus that can be reconstructed from itby focusing merely on the factidty oflegal decisions, the artificial
layer, of constructed reality. Ultimately, one must conclude, this is
just the impression the authors have conveyed in the presentation
of law in their casebook.

Politics And Theory: A Critical Account Of Popular
Sovereignty
Habermas seeks to fefound Kant's Categorical Imperative and
Rousseau's conception of the 'general wilf as the basis for a just
society (cf Habermas 1996: 103). Because the communicative
perspective must always be possible, the process of legitimate
lawmaking cannot simply allow for strategic action but allow for
the communicatively engaged citizen, one who can" be
autonomous. Habermas' claim is that this possibility is inherent
in the concept of modern law which 'already harbors the
democratic idea developed by Rousseau and Kant: the claim to
legitimacy on the part of a legal order built on rights can be
redeemed only through the socially integrative force of the
"concurring and united will of all" free and equal citizens'
(Habermas 1996: 32). One can make more sense of this if one
thinks of the general will as a universal consensus. However, it
should not be thought of as a consensus that has already been
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established (simply to be found or deduced as Rousseau (1993:
200, 213) and other social contractarians suggest) but rather as
aheadofus; ie. we can only seek its realisation, and thus we should
act and reflect in order to realise it. This is certainly, as Habermas
suggests, an idealistic orientation, but one that a legitimate
constitutional order heeds to ensure at least is not impossible.
Hence, a legitimate constitutional order would need to establish
conditions so that consensus - the conditions ofassociation upon
which there could be mutual agreement -could be reached. These
conditions regulate the processes of'opinion and will-formation'
that take place in public discourse. In a practical sense what this
means is that political participation - meaning the articulation
of interests and subjecting them to scrutiny and critique ~ is as
broadly open and radically thorough-going as possible.
Institutionalised as a system of fundamental rights this
constitutional structure is called a 'proceduralised popular
sovereignty' (Habermas 1994b: 1 and 1996: chapters 3, 4 and
Appendix 1). One can see the immediate relevance of this
approach to current controversies in Australian constitutional
law as it explains why rights ofcommunication and participation,
as well as equal treatment and due process, are the necessarily
implicit foundation for a constitution based on popular
.
sovereignty.
The implications for constitutional law theory are profound
at both the substantive and methodological levels, both ofwhich
are ignored in this- casebook. At the methodological level,
Habermas anchors the legitimacy oflaw in a democratic discourse
principle that is conceptually prior to the distinction between
law and morality and so seeks to undercut that positivist
dichotomy that has bedevilled modern jurisprudence. In direct
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opposition to po'sitivism, the idea of justice is located within the
'modern idea' of law because of the inherent claim to legitimacy
law makes, a claim that can be redeemed in practical terms
through the democratic conditions of law-making. This leads to
the substantive conception of public discourse. It is conceived
not merely as a cognitive exercise but as a communicative process
that mobilises reasons and arguments that draw on citizens'
interests, values and identities. Protecting the authenticity ofthese
interests, values and identities - the way they come to be known
and realised as one's own - and the informed and engaged citizen
is at the heart of what the constitutional state must be able to
guarantee to its addressees (Habermas 1996: xxvii~, 169, 39).
This is why Habermas' discourse theory is so at odds with liberal
discourse theories conceived as a neutral procedure for contesting
norms (for instance, contrast Po~t 1990: 6~9-640). The authors,
while discussing 'proceduralise theories of constitutional
interpretation ang judicial decision-making (Blackshield &
Williams 1998: 261-62) have overlooked entirely this substantive
proceduralism that bears so directly on the issues confronting
Australian constitutional law today.
I

Habermas' approach directly confronts the 'legalistic' view
that law is 'a conservatising ideal' (Shklar 1964 at Blackshield &
Williams 1998: 248). Instead critical discourse theory insists that,
ofall forms oflaws, it is in constitutionallaw,where the idealistic
moment is most obvious, viz. to bring .'idealistid pressure to
counter law being 'insttumentalised for the strategic deployment
of power' (Habermas 1996: 41, 168). The idea ofconstitutional
government is one which requires the state apparatus to be
organised to legitimate publicly authorised power, ie. to provide
for legitimate law-making. Hence building the democratic self-

221

Arnott

organisation of a legal community, including rights and
participatory structures, is said to be the necessary aim of
consdcutionallaw.
It is no part of this review to mention all the implications
of Habermas' discourse theory for the power of legislatures,
government, or the role of judges. Howev-er the challenge ofhis
critical theory to positivism, which dialectically leads to histheory
of popular sovereignt)r, reveals the need for a rigorous normative
theory to pervade one's approach to consrirutionallaw whatever
stance one takes on these issues. As T R S Allan has written,
constitutional principles 'might usefully be understood as a
continuing process ofargument about the requirements ofjustice
and reason - a process in which every citizen should be encouraged
to participate as an integral part of conscientious citizenship'
(AHan 1993: 16 at Blackshield & Williams 1998: 102).
BJackshield and Williams have contributed to this continuing
proces~ of argument. However, it is ironic given their apparent
sympathies, that they have done so with what too often amounts
to a legalistic presentation of case law, admittedly a presentation
which is sometimes contextualised. My concern is chat this
actually undermines conveying to their readers the utility of
theory in constitutional law. A public law needs to articulate and
expose the assumptions -of our jurisprudence and this I have
mentioned as the critical task of theory. I have great faith in the
selection ofthe extracts by the authors (and I hope my utilisation
ofsome ofthem in this review has shown that), but to that broader
critical project the-contribution ofthis casebook is disappointing.
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